Maintainer(s): Cayle Sharrock
Copyright 2019 The Tari Development Community
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
- Redistributions of this document must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS", AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (covering RFC2119 and RFC8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.
This document and its content are intended for information purposes only and may be subject to change or update without notice.
This document may include preliminary concepts that may or may not be in the process of being developed by the Tari community. The release of this document is intended solely for review and discussion by the community of the technological merits of the potential system outlined herein.
The aim of this Request for Comment (RFC) is to propose the functionality and techniques required by the Base Layer Tari wallet module. The module exposes the core wallet functionality on which user-facing wallet applications may be built.
This RFC is derived from a proposal first made in this issue.
The wallet software is responsible for constructing and negotiating transactions for transferring and receiving Tari coins on the base layer. It should also provide functionality to generate, store and recover a master seed key and derived cryptographic keypairs that can be used for Base Layer addresses and signing of transactions.
A detailed description of the required functionality of the Tari software wallet is provided in three parts:
- basic transaction functionality,
- key management features, and
- the different methods for recovering the wallet state of the Tari software wallet.
- Wallet MUST be able to send and receive Tari coins using Mimblewimble transactions.
- Wallet SHOULD be able to establish a connection with other user wallets to interactively negotiate:
- construction of the transaction,
- signing of multi-signature transactions.
- Wallet SHOULD be implemented as a library or Application Programming Interface (API) so that Graphical User Interface (GUI) or Command Line Interface (CLI) applications can be developed on top of it.
- Wallet MUST be able to establish connection to the base node, submit transactions and monitor the Tari blockchain.
- Wallet SHOULD maintain an internal ledger to keep track of the Tari coin balance.
- Wallet MAY offer transaction fee estimation, taking into account:
- transaction byte size
- network congestion
- desired transaction priority
- Wallet SHOULD be able to monitor and present states (
Unconfirmed) of previously submitted transactions, by querying information from the connected base node.
- Wallet SHOULD present the total
Unconfirmedtransactions in a summarized form.
- Wallet SHOULD be able to update its software to patch potential security vulnerabilities. Automatic updating SHOULD be enabled by default, but users can decide to opt out.
- Wallet SHOULD feature a caching mechanism for querying operations to reduce bandwidth consumption.
- Wallet MUST be able to generate a master seed key for the wallet by using at least one of the following methods:
- input from the user (e.g. when restoring a wallet or in testing),
- user-defined set of mnemonic word sequences using known word lists,
- cryptographically secure random number generator.
- Wallet SHOULD be able to generate derived, transactional, cryptographic keypairs from the master seed key using deterministic keypair generation.
- Wallet SHOULD store wallet state using a password or passphrase encrypted persistent key-value database.
- Wallet SHOULD provide the ability to store backup of the wallet state to a single encrypted file to simplify wallet recovery and reconstruction at a later stage.
- Wallet MAY provide the ability to export the master seed key or the wallet state as a printable paper wallet, using coded markers.
- Wallet MUST be able to reconstruct the wallet state from a manually entered master seed key.
- Wallet MUST have a mechanism to systematically scan through the Tari blockchain and mempool for
Unconfirmedtransactions, using keys derived from the master key.
- The master seed key SHOULD be derivable from a set of mnemonic word sequences using known word lists.
- Wallet MAY enable the reconstruction of the master seed key by scanning a coded marker of a paper wallet.
If the wallet database has been lost, corrupted or otherwise damaged, the outputs contained within (UTXOs) can still be recovered from the Tari blockchain, given you provide the valid recovery keys. When the wallet is first initialized in recovery mode, it attempts to synchronize with available base nodes, pulling blocks, attempting to recognize outputs attributed to that particular wallet.
If one can successfully decrypt the encrypted value, then the UTXO is successfully recognized. The next step is to attempt the mask (blinding factor) recovery by rewinding the range proof. All recognized and verified outputs are stored in the newly initialized, local wallet database, available for further spending.
The recovery of simple and stealth one-sided outputs is a bit more complex as we first have to recognize the output by its script pattern, before we can try to decrypt the encrypted value.
An output is recognized if it matches either of the following input script patterns:
- The standard output is the simplest, having a single
- The simple one-sided is matched by the
[Opcode::PushPubKey(scanned_pk)]so if the
scanned_pkmatches the key derived from the recovery phrase - it's recognized,
- The stealth one-sided is similar to its simple counterpart with only the script pattern being different
[Opcode::PushPubKey(nonce), Opcode::Drop, Opcode::PushPubKey(scanned_pk)], matching by the last provided
|26 Oct 2022
|14 Nov 2022
|Added table of contents, recovery process overview and a few minor adjustments
|agubarev & hansieodendaal