# RFC-0240/Atomic Swap

Maintainer(s): S W van Heerden

# Licence

Copyright 2021 The Tari Development Community

Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:

1. Redistributions of this document must retain the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific prior written permission.

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS", AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.

## Language

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY" and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 (covering RFC2119 and RFC8174) when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

## Disclaimer

This document and its content are intended for information purposes only and may be subject to change or update without notice.

This document may include preliminary concepts that may or may not be in the process of being developed by the Tari community. The release of this document is intended solely for review and discussion by the community of the technological merits of the potential system outlined herein.

## Goals

The aim of this Request for Comment (RFC) is to describe how an Atomic swap will be created.


## Description

Atomic swaps are atomic transactions that allow users to trustlessly exchange different crypto assets and or coins without the use of a central exchange. This makes it much more private and secure to do and swap because no third party is required for this to be secure. Atomic swaps work on the principle of using Hashed Time Lock Contracts(HTLC). In short, it requires some hash pre-image to unlock the contract or the time-lock can be used to reclaim the funds.

In an Atomic swap, both users lock up the funds to be exchanged on their respective chains in an HTLC-type contract. However, the pre-image, or spending secret, of the two contracts is the same, but only one party knows the correct pre-image. When the first HTLC contract is spent, then this publicly reveals the pre-image for the other party to use in spending the second HTLC. If the first HTLC is never spent, the second transaction's time-lock will allow the user to respend the funds back to themselves after the time lock has passed.

### BTC - XTR AtomicSwap

#### Overview

BTC uses a scripting language for smart contracts on transactions which enables atomic swaps on the BTC chain. Traditionally Mimblewimble coins do not implement scripts, which makes Atomic swaps harder to implement but not impossible. Grin has implemented atomic swaps using a version of a 2-of-2 multi-signature transaction mimblewimble atomic swaps. Fortunately, Tari does have scripting with TariScript which works a lot like BTC scripts, which make the implementation simpler. Because of the scripting similarities, the scripts to both HTLCs will look very similar and we only need to ensure that we use the same hash function in both.

To do an Atomic swap from BTC to XTR we need 4 wallets, 2 BTC wallets, and 2 XTR wallets, 1 wallet per person, per coin.

As an example, Alice wants to trade some of her XTR for Bob's BTC. Alice and Bob need to agree on an amount of XTR and BTC to swap. Once an agreement is reached, the swap is executed in the following steps:

• Alice chooses a set of random bytes, $\preimage$, as the pre-image and hashes it with SHA256. She then sends the hash of the pre-image, $\hash{\preimage}$, to Bob along with her BTC address.

• Bob sends her a public version of his script key, $K_{Sb}$, for use in the XTR transaction, which we can refer to as Bob's script address.

• Alice creates a one-sided XTR transaction with an HTLC contract requiring $\preimage$ as the input, which will either pay out to Bob's script address or to her script address, $K_{Sa}$, after a certain "time" has elapsed (block height has been reached).

• Bob waits for this transaction to be mined. When it is mined, he verifies that the UTXO spending script expects a comparison of $\hash{\preimage}$ as the first instruction, and that his public script key, $K_{Sb}$, will be the final value remaining after executing the script. He has the private script key, $k_{Sb}$, to enable him to produce a signature to claim the funds if he can get hold of the expected pre-image input value, $\preimage$. He also verifies that the UTXO has a sufficiently long time-lock to give him time to claim the transaction.

• Upon verification, Bob creates a Segwit HTLC BTC transaction with the same $\hash{\preimage}$, which will spend to Alice's BTC address she gave him. It is important that the time lock for this HTLC has to expire prior to the time lock of the XTR HTLC that Alice created.

• Alice checks the Bitcoin blockchain and upon seeing that the transaction is mined, she claims the transaction, but, in order for her to do so, she has to make public what $\preimage$ is as she has to use it as the witness of the claiming transaction.

• Bob sees that his BTC is spent, and looks at the witness to get $\preimage$. Bob can then use $\preimage$ to claim the XTR transaction.

#### BTC - HTLC script

Here is the required BTC script that Bob publishes:

	OP_IF
OP_SHA256 <HASH256{pre_image}> OP_EQUALVERIFY
<Alice BTC address> OP_CHECKSIG
OP_ELSE
<relative locktime>
OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY
OP_DROP
<Bob BTC address> OP_CHECKSIG
OP_ENDIF


relative locktime is a time sequence that Alice chooses to lock up the funds in order to give Bob time to claim this.

#### XTR - HTLC script

Here is the required XTR script that Alice publishes:

   HashSha256 PushHash(HASH256{pre_image}) Equal
IFTHEN
PushPubkey(K_{Sb})
ELSE
CheckHeightVerify(height)
PushPubkey(K_{Sa})
ENDIF


($K_{Sb}$) is the public key of the script key pair that Bob chooses to be able to claim this transaction if Alice backs out. height is a absolute block height that Bob chooses to lock up the funds in order to give Alice time to claim the funds.

## Notation

Where possible, the "usual" notation is used to denote terms commonly found in cryptocurrency literature. Lower case characters are used as private keys, while uppercase characters are used as public keys. New terms introduced here are assigned greek lowercase letters in most cases. Some terms used here are noted down in TariScript.

NameSymbolDefinition
Pre-image$\preimage$The random byte data used for the pre-image of the hash